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1071 
CONSTITUTIONAL MIXOLOGISTS:  
MUDDLING THE ANALYSIS OF PROTECTIONIST 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LAWS AFTER 
GRANHOLM V. HEALD 
ABSTRACT 
In its 2005 decision in Granholm v. Heald, the U.S. Supreme Court 
declared that state alcoholic beverage laws that discriminate against out-
of-state entities are unconstitutional restrictions of interstate trade under 
the dormant Commerce Clause. Despite this holding, lower courts have 
split in their analyses and conclusions regarding protectionist alcoholic 
beverage laws. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit recently upheld Missouri’s 
residency requirements for alcoholic beverage distributors. Meanwhile, a 
district court in Michigan has found that a similar law imposing residency 
requirements on alcoholic beverage retailers was an unconstitutional 
restriction of interstate commerce. This confusion adversely affects both 
consumers and smaller producers of alcoholic beverages. Therefore, this 
Note argues the Supreme Court should, in the appropriate case, clarify 
that Granholm applies to residency requirements for wholesalers and 
retailers, thereby subjecting these restrictions to heightened Commerce 
Clause scrutiny. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many smaller breweries, wineries, cideries, and distilleries (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as “producers”) limit their distribution within the 
United States, making their products available in one or more states but 
not in others.
1
 Producers do so for a variety of reasons, including limits on 
their level of production, quality control concerns, low sales potential in 
particular markets, and expensive infrastructure requirements.
2
 But there is 
 
 
 1. For example, as of 2003, less than seventeen percent of US wineries had national 
distribution. Issue Summary, FREE THE GRAPES!, http://freethegrapes.org/issue-summary/ (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/SA5X-LAD5 (citing WINE INSTITUTE, MEMBER SURVEY 
(2003)).  
 2. See, e.g., Greg Kitsock, Distribution Models, AM. BREWER, Winter 2009, at 11, 13, available 
at http://www.newglarusbrewing.com/News/DistributionModels.pdf (explaining that “[s]hipping beer 
outside your own backyard is more expensive, there’s a greater risk of beer going bad, and you need to 
rely on wholesalers who have an awful lot of other brands to sell”). Small alcoholic beverage 
producers also may not have much say in the matter—the distributors to whom they sell often have 
much more control over where their products end up. See, e.g., Hey! Why Can’t I Find Dogfish Head? 
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another possible reason that these smaller producers do not distribute to a 
particular state. If the state’s alcoholic beverage laws discriminate against 
out-of-state entities that produce, distribute, or sell alcohol, it may be 
difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to get these products imported.
3
 
The US Supreme Court held in Granholm v. Heald that such laws are 
unconstitutional, and thus opened the market for out-of-state producers to 
directly ship to consumers in states that allow their in-state producers to do 
so.
4
 Despite this holding, the lower courts are still fragmented in their 
analyses and conclusions regarding protectionist alcoholic beverage laws.
5
 
For example, the Eighth Circuit recently held that Missouri’s residency 
requirements for alcoholic beverage distributors are constitutional.
6
 
Meanwhile, a district court in Michigan found the state’s residency 
requirement for retailers to be an unconstitutional restriction of interstate 
commerce.
7
 This split contributes to the bewildering disarray of alcoholic 
beverage laws in the United States, a particularly troubling situation in 
light of the increasing market for craft producers.
8
 Many of these 
producers are considering expanding distribution,
9
 yet may be unable to 
 
 
(Or, How a Beer Gets from Us to You), DOGFISH HEAD BLOGFISH (Oct. 7, 2013, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.dogfish.com/community/blogfish/members/justin-williams/hey-why-cant-i-find-dogfish-
head-or-how-a-beer-gets-from-us-to-you.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/Y2QU-VHZN.  
 3. For example, in New York, certain producers located inside the state can be licensed as 
“farm” producers and sell directly to consumers. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 51-a(2)(e) 
(McKinney 2014) (provision authorizing farm breweries to sell directly to consumers); see also Eric 
Hawkins, Note, Great Beer, Good Intentions, Bad Law: The Unconstitutionality of New York’s Farm 
Brewery License, 56 B.C. L. REV. 313 (2015) (discussing New York’s farm brewery law). But out-of-
state producers are required to sell their product to a New York-licensed wholesaler, who in turn sells 
to a New York retailer, who then sells the product to consumers. Connor O’Shea, Protectionism in 
New York Wine Law, THE SOC’Y OF WINE & JURISPRUDENCE (Apr. 8, 2013), http://wineand 
jurisprudence.org/protectionism-in-new-york-wine-law, archived at http://perma.cc/ 4NU6-NS86. 
 4. 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005). 
 5. See James J. Williamson II, Casebrief, Raise Your Glass: The Third Circuit Holds New 
Jersey Wine Laws in Violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and Leaves Room for a Future 
Challenge of the Direct Shipment Ban, 56 VILL. L. REV. 753, 761–66 (2012) (discussing the circuit 
split). For a compilation of current state laws regarding the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages to 
consumers, see Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages to Consumers State Statutes, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-
commerce/direct-shipment-of-alcohol-state-statutes.aspx (last updated Jan. 12, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/B5H3-DR7V. 
 6. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 812 (8th 
Cir. 2013). 
 7. Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044–45 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 8. See, e.g., Stats & FAQs, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/press-
room/stats-faqs/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8F82-Z65E (detailing the 
growth of the craft beer industry). 
 9. See, e.g., Distribution Expansion, BEER ST. J., http://beerstreetjournal.com/distribution-
expansion/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/UX96-SU7C (documenting craft 
breweries that are expanding their distribution areas). 
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reach markets with smaller demand because of the costly multi-tier 
distribution systems many states mandate for the importation of alcohol 
from other states.
10
 
Part I of this Note will address the ways in which the courts, Congress, 
and the states have historically struggled with the treatment of alcoholic 
beverages under the dormant Commerce Clause. Part II will explain the 
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the subject, the 2005 case 
of Granholm v. Heald. Part III will examine post-Granholm decisions in 
which lower courts have split in their interpretation of Granholm and its 
applicability to laws that impose residency requirements on alcoholic 
beverage retailers or distributors, and will particularly focus on the most 
recent circuit court decision in this area, the Eighth Circuit’s 2013 decision 
in Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. v. Division of Alcohol & 
Tobacco Control. Finally, Part IV will argue that the Supreme Court 
should clarify that the heightened scrutiny analysis of Granholm applies to 
discriminatory state alcoholic beverage laws that impose residency 
restrictions. This Note contends that under such scrutiny, states would be 
hard pressed to justify their residency requirements as anything more than 
unconstitutional economic protectionism. 
I. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INTERPLAY OF THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE REGULATION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution states that Congress has the 
power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”11 The 
Commerce Clause also has a “dormant” aspect, which forbids states from 
unfairly protecting in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state 
entities.
12
 In other words, “state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they 
mandate differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”13 Generally, 
 
 
 10. FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 6 
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-re 
port-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
REPORT]. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause was the constitutional solution to the 
“economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States 
under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979). 
 12. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338 (2007) (citations omitted) (“[W]e have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit 
restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute. To determine whether a 
law violates this so-called ‘dormant’ aspect of the Commerce Clause, we first ask whether it 
discriminates on its face against interstate commerce.”). 
 13. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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courts utilize two types of scrutiny to determine if these laws are 
constitutional. For statutes that “burden interstate transactions only 
incidentally,” courts use a less-searching scrutiny in which parties 
challenging the laws must show that “the burdens they impose on 
interstate trade are ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.’”14 For statutes that “affirmatively discriminate” against interstate 
commerce either on their face or in practical effect, courts apply a “more 
demanding scrutiny” in which “the burden falls on the State to 
demonstrate both that the statute ‘serves a legitimate local purpose,’ and 
that this purpose could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means.”15 
The rationale behind states’ desire to provide competitive advantages 
to in-state alcoholic beverage entities stems from the alcoholic beverage 
industry’s tax revenue potential.16 Courts, Congress, and the states have a 
long history, even prior to Prohibition, of grappling with how the 
regulation of alcohol should be examined pursuant to the dormant 
Commerce Clause.
17
 This Part will briefly examine that history. 
Congress passed two major laws in the pre-Prohibition era that 
attempted to delineate the amount of power states have over alcoholic 
beverages. The first, the Wilson Act, was passed in 1890 and allowed 
states to “regulate imported liquor on the same terms as domestic 
liquor.”18 The second, the Webb-Kenyon Act,19 was passed in 1913 to 
close some Wilson Act loopholes
20
 by giving states the authority to 
regulate the direct shipment of liquor from interstate sources.
21
 But useful 
experience with Webb-Kenyon was short lived. In 1919, the states ratified 
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
22
 which rendered Webb-
 
 
 14. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970)). 
 15. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)). 
 16. See RICHARD MENDELSON, FROM DEMON TO DARLING: A LEGAL HISTORY OF WINE IN 
AMERICA 24 (2009) (describing how the “alcoholic beverage industry became increasingly entrenched 
in American law, culture, and politics” due to its role as a major source of tax revenue). 
 17. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 101 (1897) (holding that “when a state recognizes the 
manufacture, sale and use of intoxicating liquors as lawful, it cannot discriminate against . . . importing 
[such articles] from other states” and that “such legislation is void as a hindrance to interstate 
commerce and an unjust preference of the products of the enacting state”). 
 18. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478 (discussing the Wilson Act of 1890, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2014)).  
 19. Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2014). The Wilson Act and Webb-Kenyon Act 
are still in force today. See MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 47. 
 20. See Danielle M. Teagarden, Note, Brewing Tension: The Constitutionality of Indiana’s 
Sunday Beer-Carryout Laws, 47 IND. L. REV. 335, 342–43 (2014). 
 21. 27 U.S.C. § 122. 
 22. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484. 
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Kenyon pointless by prohibiting “the manufacture, sale, or transportation 
of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the 
exportation thereof from the United States and all the territory subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes.”23 
Fourteen years of Prohibition failed to curb alcohol consumption and 
sparked a crime wave revolving around illegal manufacturing and 
distribution of alcoholic beverages.
24
 In the wake of this largely 
unsuccessful national experiment, and motivated by the economic 
pressures of the Great Depression,
25
 the states ratified the Twenty-First 
Amendment in 1933 to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment.
26
 However, 
Congress wanted to allow each state to choose whether liquor would be 
allowed for sale within that state.
27
 To that end, section two of the Twenty-
First Amendment prohibits “[t]he transportation or importation into any 
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof.”28 Each 
state was left to manage the social responsibility element of alcoholic 
beverage consumption within its borders and shut down the criminal 
network of illegal trade in alcohol that had developed during Prohibition.
29
 
States responded to these problems in a variety of ways.
30
 Some states 
initially chose to remain dry.
31
 Others passed the responsibility onto 
localities by allowing for a “local option,” wherein counties or 
municipalities could decide whether to legalize alcohol.
32
 When a state did 
choose to legalize alcoholic beverages, it needed a system to control the 
legal distribution and taxation of the product. This was generally 
accomplished in one of two ways: the state either enacted a three-tier 
 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933). 
 24. See MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 50–93. 
 25. See id. at 88 (explaining that the “Great Depression provided new arguments and enthusiasm 
for the proponents of Repeal”); Seth G. Mehrten, Comment, Pruning Direct Shipping Barriers for 
Optimal Yield: How the Dormant Commerce Clause Limits the Twenty-First Amendment, 21 SAN 
JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 155, 163–64 (2012).  
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
 27. See MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 90. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
 29. See MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 51 (“Lawlessness is the longest-lasting legacy of 
Prohibition. . . . Criminal syndicates ran a black market for liquor, associating it with a variety of 
vices.”); Shirley Chen, Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 526, 
528 (2014). 
 30. See MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 96–121. 
 31. Id. at 99, 230 n.23 (explaining that there were seven dry states in 1936, three in 1940, and 
none as of 1966).  
 32. See id. at 99 (noting that many “local option” laws are still in effect today). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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system
33
 to create a competitive market for alcoholic beverages under 
strict state control of the state, or it enacted a control system in which the 
state government would have a legal monopoly over the wholesale tier—
and sometimes the retail tier—of the distribution system.34 In a control 
system, the state effectively substitutes itself for the private marketplace 
by retaining the exclusive right to sell alcohol through government-
operated enterprises at the wholesale or retail level.
35
 In a three-tier 
system, the state turns the sale of alcohol over to the private marketplace, 
maintaining control by funneling alcohol through a system of strictly 
licensed producers, wholesalers, and retailers.
36
 
Three-tier systems were enacted primarily to prohibit so-called “tied-
house” arrangements, common before Prohibition,37 wherein alcoholic 
beverage producers (particularly breweries) would also own retail 
establishments such as saloons or taverns that only sold their own 
beverages.
38
 States were particularly concerned with two dangers of the 
tied-house arrangements: “the ability and potentiality of large firms to 
dominate local markets through vertical and horizontal integration and the 
excessive sales of alcoholic beverages produced by the overly aggressive 
 
 
 33. The three-tier distribution system is the most common way states regulate the sale of 
alcoholic beverages within their borders. See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th 
Cir. 2000). The three tiers are manufacturers (or producers) of alcoholic beverages, distributors (or 
wholesalers), and retailers. See id. 
 34. See Lindsey A. Zahn, Is There a Future for the Three-Tier Alcohol Beverage Distribution 
System?, ON RESERVE: A WINE LAW BLOG (July 28, 2010), http://www.winelawonreserve.com/ 
2010/07/28/is-there-a-future-for-the-three-tier-alcoholic-beverage-distribution-system/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NR7L-MEXA (explaining that under the control system “state governments maintain a 
legal monopoly over the distribution tier” and sometimes the retail tier as well); Chen, supra note 29, 
at 529 (describing the two systems). 
 35. See Historical Overview, NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, http://www.nabca. 
org/page/historical-overview (last visited Apr. 5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/UC2U-2BYG. 
This Note does not focus on the control system, but it is worth noting that even absent the Twenty-
First Amendment’s grant of power, under the market participant doctrine, a state may be able to 
discriminate in favor of in-state entities when it acts as a participant in a particular market. See, e.g., 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809–10 (1976) (recognizing that states may 
participate in a particular market and favor their own citizens within that market); Brooks v. Vassar, 
462 F.3d 341, 355–60 (4th Cir. 2006) (using the market participant doctrine to uphold Virginia’s 
limitation of selling only Virginia wines in its state-owned retail stores). However, if the state has a 
true monopoly over the liquor market, it may no longer be considered a “participant” and therefore 
may be subject to heightened Commerce Clause scrutiny. See Brooks, 462 F.3d at 363 (Goodwin, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Virginia actually had a monopoly, such that the market participant exception 
did not apply). 
 36. See Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 487 P.2d 745, 
748 (Cal. 1971). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 30–33.  
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marketing techniques of larger alcoholic beverage concerns.”39 By 
separating alcoholic beverage distribution into three tiers and prohibiting 
entities from holding a license for more than one tier, the three-tier system 
was meant to prevent these tied-house arrangements and the saloons they 
produced. 
Since the Twenty-First Amendment’s ratification, courts—including 
the Supreme Court—have struggled to interpret the states’ “virtually 
complete control”40 over the importation and distribution of liquor within 
their borders when a state’s use of that control implicates the dormant 
Commerce Clause.
41
 In 2005, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the 
analysis in its decision in Granholm v. Heald.
42
 
II. THE SUPREME COURT FINDS DISCRIMINATORY STATE LIQUOR LAWS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY 
The Supreme Court handed down its most recent and definitive ruling 
on the subject of unconstitutionally discriminatory state liquor laws in the 
2005 case of Granholm v. Heald.
43
 In Granholm, the Court reviewed 
challenges to two state liquor laws, one in Michigan and one in New 
York.
44
 The Supreme Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment neither 
saves state liquor laws from dormant Commerce Clause analysis nor alters 
the level of scrutiny to be used in this analysis.
45
 This Part will review the 
two laws that were challenged; the Court’s analysis, reasoning, and 
holding; and the Court’s dicta on the continued constitutionality of the 
three-tier system. 
The Michigan law at issue in Granholm required wine producers to 
distribute their wine through in-state wholesalers.
46
 In-state wineries, 
 
 
 39. Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n, 487 P.2d at 748 (citations omitted). These aggressive 
marketing techniques included “free lunches, free rounds (known as ‘treating’), free goods such as 
glassware and serving trays, and activities such as billiards, not to speak of gambling and prostitution.” 
MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 31–32 (footnote omitted). 
 40. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) 
(cautioning, however, that this control “may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate 
situations”). 
 41. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486–89 (2005) (describing the history of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence regarding protectionist state liquor laws after the enactment of the Twenty-First 
Amendment). 
 42. Id. at 464–93. 
 43. Id. at 493; see also S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 
731 F.3d 799, 806 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Granholm is the Court’s most recent pronouncement on the 
subject.”). 
 44. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 465. 
 45. See id. at 493. 
 46. Id. at 469. 
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however, could obtain a “wine maker” license that allowed them to ship 
wine directly to in-state consumers.
47
 New York’s law set out a more 
complex scheme, only allowing out-of-state wineries to ship directly to 
consumers if they first established a distribution operation—consisting of, 
at minimum, a branch office, factory, or warehouse—in New York.48  
The Court began by determining that Michigan’s and New York’s 
direct-shipping laws discriminated against interstate commerce.
49
 
According to the Court, these types of laws: (1) deprive citizens of their 
right to equal access to the markets of all states;
50
 (2) necessitate reciprocal 
sales laws stemming from an “ongoing, low-level trade war”;51 and 
(3) create prohibitive barriers to entry for out-of-state producers by 
increasing overhead costs.
52
 Importantly, the Court found that New York’s 
requirement that out-of-state wineries establish an in-state presence 
violated Supreme Court precedent disapproving of such residency 
requirements.
53
 As the Court explained, “[s]tates cannot require an out-of-
state firm ‘to become a resident in order to compete on equal terms.’”54  
Having decided that Michigan’s and New York’s laws were 
discriminatory, the Court next asked whether such laws “violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause in light of § 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment.”55 First, the Court determined that section two neither 
authorized nor saved the Michigan and New York statutes in question.
56
 
The Court then applied the heightened scrutiny analysis required for 
 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 470. Additionally, even when out-of-state wineries met this residency requirement, they 
were still ineligible to obtain a “farm winery” license, which would have provided the most direct 
means of shipment to New York consumers. Id. at 475. The Court explained that these requirements 
amounted to an “indirect way of subjecting out-of-state wineries, but not local ones, to the three-tier 
system.” Id. at 474; see also Chen, supra note 29, at 532. 
 49. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. 
 50. Id. at 473. 
 51. Id. (explaining that reciprocal trade laws “condition the right of out-of-state wineries to make 
direct wine sales to in-state consumers on a reciprocal right in the shipping State”). 
 52. Id. at 474–75. In fact, no out-of-state wineries had even attempted to “run the State’s 
regulatory gauntlet” in New York. Id. at 474. 
 53. Id. at 475–76. 
 54. Id. at 475 (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reilly, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963)). 
 55. Id. at 471. 
 56. Id. at 487–89 (discussing Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984), in which 
the Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment does not authorize state alcoholic beverage laws 
whose legislative purpose is “mere economic protectionism”). The Court examined the legislative and 
judicial history of interstate liquor laws at length, finding that both Congress and the Court had 
consistently disfavored allowing states to protect in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state goods. 
Id. at 476–89. 
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discriminatory laws,
57
 asking “whether either state regime ‘advances a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.’”58 To survive such scrutiny, the state has 
the burden of demonstrating: (1) that its discriminatory law serves at least 
one distinct local purpose; and (2) that there are no nondiscriminatory laws 
that could sufficiently advance the same goal.
59
 This is a heavy burden, as 
the Court requires the “clearest showing” that the discriminatory law is the 
only way the state can adequately advance its legitimate purpose.
60
  
The Granholm Court held that Michigan and New York had failed to 
meet this burden.
61
 The Court dismissed the states’ two primary 
justifications, “keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and facilitating 
tax collection,”62 reasoning that the states had not shown that either of 
these was substantially furthered by the restriction of direct shipments by 
out-of-state wineries.
63
 According to the Court, the states had failed to 
provide enough evidence that minors were using the Internet to purchase 
wine.
64
 Instead, the Court cited a Federal Trade Commission report with a 
contrary finding.
65
 The tax-collection grounds also failed. The Court 
determined that Michigan’s system of “licensing and self-reporting,” 
which provided “adequate safeguards for wine distributed through the 
three-tier system,” would also be effective for direct shipments.66 
Similarly, in New York, less discriminatory means were available to 
facilitate tax collection, such as requiring a direct-shipment permit along 
with applicable sales reporting and tax payments.
67
 The Court also noted 
that technological improvements, such as the availability of electronic 
 
 
 57. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (explaining the levels of scrutiny required by 
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence); see also Amy Murphy, Note, Discarding the 
North Dakota Dictum: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of the Three-Tier Distribution System, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 819, 828 (2012). 
 58. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 
(1988)). 
 59.  See id. at 489. 
 60. See id. at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 489. 
 63. Id. at 489–92.  
 64.  Id. at 490. 
 65. Id. (citing FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 34). The Court also noted that even if increased 
underage drinking were a legitimate concern, this would not justify discriminating against out-of-state 
direct shipments, because “minors are just as likely to order wine from in-state producers.” Id.  
 66. Id. at 491. 
 67. Id. The Court also noted that the 2003 FTC Report found no disclosed problems with tax 
collection in states that allowed direct interstate wine shipments. Id. (citing FTC REPORT, supra note 
10, at 38–40). 
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background checks and electronic transfer of financial records and sales 
data, have “eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state wineries.”68 
The Court concluded that the two state laws unfairly and 
unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce.
69
 Allowing 
in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers while prohibiting out-of-
state wineries from doing so was unconstitutional economic protectionism 
that was neither saved by the Twenty-First Amendment nor justified by 
the states’ purported local purposes.70 However, the Granholm Court also 
reaffirmed a proposition from a previous Supreme Court decision, North 
Dakota v. United States,
71
 in which the Court recognized the three-tier 
distribution system itself as being “unquestionably legitimate.”72 While 
this reaffirmation was dictum,
73
 the language appears to be of central 
importance to the circuit court decisions that have upheld discriminatory 
state liquor laws after Granholm.
74
 The Court in Granholm suggested that 
as long as a three-tier system does not favor in-state entities over out-of-
state entities, it can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
75
 Viewed in 
context,
76
 the Court’s statement has been interpreted as distinguishing 
structural distribution laws that “treat liquor produced out of state the same 
as its domestic equivalent” from “straightforward attempts to discriminate 
in favor of local producers,” such as the Michigan and New York laws in 
Granholm.
77
 Structural distribution laws fall within the states’ Twenty-
 
 
 68. Id. at 492. 
 69. Id. at 493. 
 70. Id. (explaining that states’ “broad power to regulate liquor” did “not allow States to ban, or 
severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct 
shipment by in-state producers”). Four justices dissented and, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, argued 
that alcohol should be analyzed differently than other articles of commerce under the dormant 
Commerce Clause due to the power granted to the states by the Webb-Kenyon Act and Twenty-First 
Amendment. Id. at 497–527 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 71. 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990). 
 72. Id. (as cited by Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. See, e.g., S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 
799, 809 (8th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the language may be dictum, but nonetheless compelling); 
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). 
 74. See, e.g., Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 819, 821 (5th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1270 (2011); Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 571 F.3d at 190–91; see also generally 
Murphy, supra note 57, at 829–31. 
 75. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 485–89. But see Murphy, supra note 57, at 837 (arguing that the 
Granholm Court “recited the North Dakota dictum in an ill-considered fashion” and that “North 
Dakota had no place in Granholm’s analysis”). 
 76.  See Ind. Petro. Marketers & Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook, 808 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 
2015) (explaining that Granholm’s statement regarding the “unquestionably legitimate” nature of the 
three-tier system “must be understood in context” and that the test is whether “a three-tier distribution 
system . . . treats all alcohol sales equivalently regardless of origin”). 
 77. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.  
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First Amendment authority; discriminatory laws do not.
78
 The lower 
courts, however, have struggled to separate what is “structural” from what 
is “discriminatory,” contributing to the split in authority discussed below.  
III. THE LOWER COURTS CONFRONT THE IMPLICATIONS OF GRANHOLM 
FOR STATE LIQUOR LAWS THAT IMPOSE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 
Despite Granholm, circuit and district courts continue to come down 
on different sides of the issue of whether and to what extent state alcoholic 
beverage laws can constitutionally differentiate between in-state and out-
of-state entities, particularly distributors and retailers.
79
 In response to 
Granholm, many states have revised their alcoholic beverage laws
80
 but 
have not completely abandoned attempts to protect in-state entities.
81
 In 
particular, many states still distinguish between in-state and out-of-state 
distributors and retailers, allowing in-state entities to ship directly to 
consumers while prohibiting out-of-state entities from doing so.
82
 Despite 
challenges declaring that these types of state alcoholic beverage laws 
violate the holding in Granholm, the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits 
have found such laws constitutional, based on the language of the Twenty-
First Amendment and the “unquestionably legitimate” language in 
Granholm.
83
 Several district courts have come to the opposite conclusion, 
 
 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Williamson, supra note 5, at 761–66 (discussing the circuit split). 
 80. See, e.g., Robert Taylor, U.S. Wine Shipping Laws, State by State, WINE SPECTATOR, 
http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/50258#WineryMap (last updated Mar. 31, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/VGC9-L4D6 (“The number of states that permit winery direct-to-consumer 
shipping has risen from 27 in 2005 to 42 as of January 2016 . . . .”); see also Maureen K. Ohlhausen & 
Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways: Post-Granholm Developments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their 
Implications for Competition, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 512–13, 516 (2008) (documenting states that 
amended their statutes post-Granholm to permit direct shipping from wineries). 
 81. See William C. Green, Creating a Common Market for Wine: Boutique Wines, Direct 
Shipment, and State Alcohol Regulation, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 14 & n.6 (2012) (citing Ohlhausen 
& Luib, supra note 80, at 514 nn.64–67). Current state laws regarding the direct shipment of alcoholic 
beverages are described in Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages to Consumers State Statutes, supra 
note 5. 
 82. See Taylor, supra note 80 (explaining that “most states will allow consumers to have wine 
delivered from a local retailer, but not from one beyond the state’s borders”). In fact, since Granholm, 
the number of states allowing out-of-state retailers to ship directly to consumers has actually “fallen, 
from 18 states in 2005 to just 14 today.” Id. Moreover, several of the states that allow direct shipping 
from out-of-state retailers have reciprocity provisions such that consumers are only allowed “to receive 
wine orders from retailers located in other states whose consumers are permitted to order wine from its 
retailers.” Id. 
 83. See S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 802, 
812 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding a Missouri law that required 
wholesalers to be “resident corporation[s]” and allowed such a designation only when all corporate 
officers and directors had been “bona fide residents” of the state for at least three years); Wine Country 
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determining that such regulations are unconstitutionally restrictive of 
interstate commerce, based on the Commerce Clause and the holding in 
Granholm.
84
  
The Granholm Court only explicitly addressed the constitutionality of 
discriminatory alcoholic beverage laws that favored in-state wineries over 
out-of-state wineries,
85
 leaving the legality of other discriminatory laws 
open to interpretation. First, it is unclear whether the Court’s holding in 
Granholm applies to the other two tiers in the three-tier system. Therefore, 
lower courts have split in their analyses of state laws that distinguish 
between in-state and out-of-state distributors and retailers. Second, 
Granholm left undecided how, if at all, the analysis should change for 
evenhanded laws—those that do not, on their face, distinguish between in-
state and out-of-state alcoholic beverage entities. It is unclear how these 
facially neutral laws should be treated when they discriminate or burden 
interstate commerce either in purpose or in effect.
86
 Finally, since the laws 
in Granholm dealt specifically with wineries, it is unclear how Granholm 
should apply to laws that discriminate against other types of alcoholic 
beverage producers.
87
 This Note focuses only on the first question 
identified above, and this Part examines the lower court decisions that 
have analyzed how Granholm applies to state alcoholic beverage laws that 
impose residency requirements on distributors and retailers.   
 
 
Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1270 (2011) 
(upholding a Texas law requiring retailers to maintain a physical presence in the state in order to 
deliver to consumers located roughly within the same county as the retailer, but not overruling the 
District Court’s invalidation of a one-year citizenship requirement for retailers); Arnold’s Wines, Inc. 
v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a New York law allowing in-state, but not out-
of-state, retailers to deliver to consumers).  
 84. See, e.g., Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044–45 (E.D. Mich. 
2008) (invalidating a Michigan law that allowed in-state retailers to ship to consumers but prohibited 
out-of-state retailers from doing so); S. Wine & Spirits of Tex., Inc. v. Steen, 486 F. Supp. 2d 626, 632 
(W.D. Tex. 2007) (invalidating a Texas law requiring one year of residency for alcoholic beverage 
wholesalers because the law was facially discriminatory and because the state failed to “prove that no 
nondiscriminatory alternative means” were available to achieve Texas’ interest in ensuring distributors 
“have a stake in the welfare of the community in which they operate”). 
 85.  Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
 86. See Green, supra note 81, at 42–43 (explaining how various parties have read Granholm 
either as being limited to facially discriminatory laws or as being applicable to statutes that 
discriminate in purpose or effect). 
 87. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 29, at 543 (arguing that Granholm should apply to direct-
shipment laws for breweries as well). 
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A.  A District Court Finds a One-Year Residency Requirement for 
Wholesalers Unconstitutional 
In 2007, the US District Court for the Western District of Texas 
invalidated the state’s one-year residency requirement for wholesalers in 
Southern Wine and Spirits of Texas, Inc. v. Steen.
88
 Texas required 
applicants for alcoholic beverage permits to be residents and citizens of 
the state for at least one year prior to filing their application.
89
 The Texas 
Alcoholic Beverage Commission (“TABC”) conceded that this statute was 
facially discriminatory and attempted to justify the statute as advancing a 
legitimate local purpose that could not be adequately served by 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.
90
 TABC proffered three such purposes for 
its laws:  
(1) they ensure that those who distribute a dangerous product, 
alcoholic beverages, have a stake in the welfare of the community 
in which they operate; (2) they provide a guard against the threats of 
organized crime; and (3) nonresident absentee owners have less 
incentive to refrain from practices that, although profitable, could 
expose the community to harm.
91
 
The court reviewed an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Cooper v. McBeath,
92
 
that had invalidated “Texas’s durational residency and citizenship statutes 
regarding mixed-beverage retail permits and licenses” and found that the 
holding and reasoning in Cooper applied to this case.
93
  
The court found unpersuasive TABC’s argument that the residency 
requirement was needed to ensure that distributors have a stake in the 
welfare of the community.
94
 The court noted that because “Texas is a large 
state,” in many cases an out-of-state wholesaler will be closer to a Texas 
consumer than an in-state wholesaler located on the other side of Texas.
95
 
TABC’s justifications presented “no more a compelling case” than the 
justifications rejected by the Supreme Court in Granholm.
96
 As the state 
“wholly failed” to meet its “burden of demonstrating, under rigorous 
 
 
 88. 486 F. Supp. 2d at 627–33.  
 89. Id. at 628–29. 
 90. Id. at 630. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 11 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994).  
 93. Steen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
 94. Id. at 631–32. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 632. 
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scrutiny, that it ha[d] no other means to advance a legitimate local 
interest,” the court held that Texas’s one-year residency requirement was 
unconstitutional as applied to wholesalers.
97
 
B. The Fifth Circuit Upholds a Physical Presence Requirement for 
Retailers 
In 2008, the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
declared that Texas’s one-year residency requirement was equally 
unconstitutional as applied to alcoholic beverage retailers.
98
 The Fifth 
Circuit reviewed this decision in the 2010 case of Wine Country Gift 
Baskets.com v. Steen.
99
 The Fifth Circuit did not reverse the invalidation of 
the one-year citizenship requirement.
100
 But the court did uphold Texas’s 
statute requiring retailers to maintain a physical presence in the state to 
deliver to consumers there.
101
  
The Fifth Circuit analogized the three-tier system to a funnel with “an 
opening at the top available to all.”102 The court meant that after 
Granholm, producers could ship directly to consumers regardless of where 
the producer is located.
103
 However, according to the court, a state may 
require wholesalers and retailers to be within the state to ship directly to 
consumers there.
104
 This is contrary to Granholm’s explanation that a law 
is discriminatory when it requires an out-of-state entity to “become a 
resident in order to compete on equal terms,” and that such laws trigger 
heightened scrutiny that requires the state to justify its law as having a 
legitimate local purpose that could not be adequately served by 
nondiscriminatory means.
105
  
But the Fifth Circuit read Granholm as concluding that the dormant 
Commerce Clause applies differently to alcoholic beverages because of 
the Twenty-First Amendment and limited Granholm to prohibiting 
“discrimination against out-of-state products or producers,” not 
 
 
 97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98. Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Perry, 530 F. Supp. 2d 848, 868–74 (N.D. Tex. 2008), vacated on 
other grounds, Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821–22 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 99. 612 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1270 (2011). 
 100. Id. at 812–13, 821–22 (explaining, inter alia, that Texas did not contest this decision). 
 101. Id. at 811, 821–22.  
 102. Id. at 815. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 475, 489 (2005). 
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wholesalers or retailers.
106
 Again, this is contrary to Granholm, which 
prohibits state laws “that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply 
to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”107 The district 
court in this case had considered “[t]he disability imposed on out-of-state 
retailers” and found the Texas statute discriminatory.108 But because the 
Fifth Circuit instead compared the burdens imposed on in-state and out-of-
state products and producers, it did not find any discrimination that would 
trigger heightened scrutiny.
109
  
The Fifth Circuit also concentrated on the fact that Texas’s statute 
allowed in-state retailers to make sales “to proximate consumers, not those 
distant to the store.”110 But if Granholm’s discrimination analysis ended 
with products and producers, it should not have mattered whether in-state 
retailers were allowed to ship only locally or throughout the whole state. 
This reasoning strays from Granholm’s central message: that 
discriminatory alcoholic beverage laws are subject to the same heightened 
scrutiny as any other protectionist laws. Instead, the Fifth Circuit focused 
on the Supreme Court’s dictum about the constitutionality of the three-tier 
system.
111
  
The Fifth Circuit viewed the “local deliveries as a constitutionally 
benign incident of an acceptable three-tier system.”112 But here, as 
plaintiff-appellant Wine Country explained, “the three tiers have tumbled 
because Texas has permitted [in-state] retailers to make home deliveries” 
while prohibiting out-of-state retailers from doing so.
113
 This is what 
Granholm said as well: once a state allows in-state entities to ship directly 
to consumers, it can no longer prohibit out-of-state entities in the same tier 
 
 
 106. Wine Country Gift Baskets.com, 612 F.3d at 820. The court also utilized the “unquestionably 
legitimate” language about three-tier systems from Granholm to answer this challenge to “an inherent 
aspect of that system.” Id. at 818, 821. The Fifth Circuit’s sentiment on this issue may be changing. 
See Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Comm'n, No. 14-51343, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7269 (5th Cir. 
Apr. 21, 2016). In Cooper, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Wine Country by explaining that “state 
regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just 
because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor.” Id. at *26 (expressly declining to follow 
S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
Thus, in the Fifth Circuit’s view, the Twenty-first Amendment allows states to “impose a physical-
residency requirement on retailers and wholesalers of alcoholic beverages” but not “a durational-
residency requirement on the owners of alcoholic beverage retailers and wholesalers.” Id. 
 107. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added). 
 108. Wine Country Gift Baskets.com, 612 F.3d at 818 (citing Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Perry, 530 
F. Supp. 2d 848, 865–66 (N.D. Tex. 2008)). 
 109. Id. at 819–21. 
 110. Id. at 820. 
 111. Id. at 818–19.  
 112. Id. at 820. 
 113. Id. at 819. 
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from doing the same. The Texas law “deprive[s] citizens of their right to 
have access to the markets of other States on equal terms”114 because in-
state retailers are allowed to do what out-of-state retailers are not: ship 
directly to consumers.
115
 Therefore, the statute should have been subject to 
the heightened scrutiny analysis required by Granholm. 
C.  A District Court Finds a Physical Presence Requirement for Retailers 
Unconstitutional 
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the US District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan determined in Siesta Village Market, LLC v. 
Granholm that the state had impermissibly discriminated against out-of-
state retailers by only allowing retailers that maintained a location in the 
state to ship directly to consumers.
116
 The court correctly analyzed the 
Supreme Court’s Granholm decision as prohibiting “a system that 
discriminates against out-of-state interests.”117 Michigan’s statute 
“create[d] an extra burden on out-of-state wine retailers” by requiring 
them to “open a location in Michigan, become part of the three-tier 
system,” and then obtain a direct shipping license.118 The court viewed this 
as creating “a higher overhead cost for doing business . . . for out-of-state 
businesses” and noted that the Supreme Court in Granholm had struck 
down such differential treatment.
119
  
After determining the statute was discriminatory, the court applied 
Granholm’s heightened scrutiny, requiring Michigan to prove “that the 
law serves a legitimate local purpose and that the purpose cannot be 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory means.”120 The state 
made no attempt to show why nondiscriminatory alternatives would be 
ineffective or discuss why the procedures it used to regulate direct 
shipments from out-of-state producers “would be unworkable in regulating 
shipments from out-of-state retailers.”121 Instead, Michigan argued that 
allowing out-of-state retailers to directly ship to consumers would prevent 
the state from being able to “stop tax evasion” or “enforce labeling laws,” 
 
 
 114. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005) (emphasis added); see also id. at 475 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“We have viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business 
operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.”). 
 115.  Wine Country Gift Baskets.com, 612 F.3d at 812. 
 116. 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044–45 (E.D. Mich. 2008).  
 117. Id. at 1039. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1040. 
 121. Id. at 1041. 
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“underage drinking laws,” or “anti-tied-house vertical integration laws.”122 
Since the state did not show any alternatives or why such alternatives 
would be unworkable, the court found that Michigan’s concerns amounted 
to speculation “that it may have trouble regulating . . . out-of-state retailers 
without setting forth concrete proof that this will be the case.”123 
Furthermore, the state’s concern that “tax revenue would be lost” was “not 
a legitimate reason to uphold a discriminatory statute under well-
established Commerce Clause law.”124 Because the state had failed to meet 
its burden to justify the discriminatory statute, the court struck down 
Michigan’s residency requirement for retailers.125 
D. The Second Circuit Upholds a Statute That Allowed Only In-State 
Retailers to Deliver to Consumers 
In 2009, the Second Circuit upheld a New York law that allowed in-
state, but not out-of-state, retailers to deliver to consumers in Arnold’s 
Wines, Inc. v. Boyle.
126
 The New York law permitted New York retailers 
to obtain off-premises licenses, allowing them to deliver alcohol to 
consumers’ homes.127 Out-of-state retailers could not obtain such a 
license,
128
 thus imposing a residency requirement on these retailers to be 
able to ship directly to New York consumers. The court interpreted 
Supreme Court precedent, including Granholm, and determined that “the 
Twenty-first Amendment alters dormant Commerce Clause analysis” for 
state liquor laws.
129
 
The Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ challenge was a “frontal 
attack on the constitutionality of the three-tier system itself” and thus 
foreclosed by the “unquestionably legitimate” language in Granholm.130 
Because “[a]lcohol sold by in-state retailers directly to consumers in New 
 
 
 122. Id. at 1041–42. 
 123. Id. at 1041–43. 
 124. Id. at 1043. 
 125. Id. at 1045. 
 126. 571 F.3d 185, 187–88, 192 (2d Cir. 2009). In a concurring opinion, Judge Calabresi agreed 
completely with the outcome and reasoning, but observed that confusion about the meaning of the 
Twenty-First Amendment leaves uncertainty about where the Supreme Court will head next in its 
interpretation of this amendment. Id. at 192, 198–201 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. at 188. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. This interpretation is at odds with the language of the Granholm opinion: “the Twenty-
first Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not 
displace the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers.” 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486 (2005). 
 130. Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 571 F.3d at 190–91. 
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York has already passed through the first two tiers—producer and 
wholesaler—and been taxed and regulated accordingly,” a similar 
requirement for out-of-state liquor did not increase delivery costs.
131
 
Therefore, the court concluded that the statute treated in-state and out-of-
state liquor evenhandedly by requiring all of it to pass through the same 
three-tier system.
132
 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit compared 
the treatment of products and producers, not wholesalers or retailers.
133
 
Again, this ignores Granholm’s explanation that laws “that burden out-of-
state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-
state businesses” are discriminatory.134 Because the Second Circuit 
determined that New York did “not discriminate against out-of-state 
products or producers,” this ended its dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis.
135
  
E.  The Eighth Circuit Finds a Wholesaler Residency Requirement 
Constitutional 
The Eighth Circuit reviewed a Missouri residency requirement in its 
2013 decision of Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. v. Division of 
Alcohol & Tobacco Control.
136
 The court reviewed a Missouri law 
requiring a wholesaler to be a “resident corporation” to apply for a liquor 
distribution license and allowing a corporation to be designated a 
“resident” only when its officers and directors had all been “bona fide 
residents” of the state for at least three years.137 Southern Wine & Spirits 
of America, Inc. (“SWSA”), a Florida corporation, challenged this 
provision after its wholly owned subsidiary, Southern Wine & Spirits of 
Missouri, Inc. (“Southern Missouri”), was denied a wholesaler license 
because Southern Missouri failed to satisfy the residency requirement.
138
 
The Eighth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had sent “conflicting 
signals” regarding the Commerce Clause in light of the Twenty-First 
 
 
 131. Id. at 191. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 134. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added). 
 135. Arnold’s Wines, Inc., 571 F.3d at 191–92. Limiting Granholm’s heightened scrutiny analysis 
to products and producers is inconsistent with both general Commerce Clause jurisprudence and 
Granholm’s interpretation of the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause. Murphy, supra note 57, at 
842–43. 
 136. 731 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 137. Id. at 802. 
 138. Id. 
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Amendment.
139
 Similar to the Fifth Circuit in Wine Country Gift 
Baskets.com, the court interpreted Granholm as drawing “a bright line 
between the producer tier and the rest of the system.”140 The court rejected 
SWSA’s evidence of protectionist intent.141 It also decided that “state 
policies that define the structure of the liquor distribution system” are 
“‘protected’ against constitutional challenges based on the Commerce 
Clause.”142 Since the residency requirement at issue defined “the extent of 
in-state presence required to qualify as a wholesaler in the three-tier 
system,” the court decided that this was a structural state policy.143 The 
court held that the state should have “flexibility to define the requisite 
degree of ‘in-state’ presence to include the in-state residence of 
wholesalers’ directors and officers.”144 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth 
Circuit did not appear to address Granholm’s explanation that “[s]tates 
cannot require an out-of-state firm to become a resident in order to 
compete on equal terms.”145 
The Eighth Circuit also held that, assuming that the policies were 
subject to deferential scrutiny, Missouri had “established a sufficient basis 
for its residency requirement.”146 This basis included a belief that a 
wholesaler whose owners are Missouri residents is “more apt to be 
socially responsible” and “more likely to respond to concerns of the 
community.”147 The problem with this analysis is that Granholm requires a 
discriminatory statute to survive heightened scrutiny, which imposes a 
heavy burden on the state.
148
 Missouri failed to provide any 
nondiscriminatory alternatives or explain why such alternatives would be 
unworkable, and therefore its requirement should have failed Granholm’s 
scrutiny analysis. But the Eighth Circuit concluded that Missouri’s 
 
 
 139. Id. at 804 (explaining how the Supreme Court’s early broad interpretation of states’ power 
under the Twenty-First Amendment has been narrowed considerably over the decades). 
 140. Id. at 810; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 141. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., 731 F.3d at 807–08. SWSA relied on a newspaper article 
published contemporaneously with the statute in question that described a state senator’s view that the 
law was intended to prevent monopolization by out-of-state wholesalers. Id. at 807. The court 
dismissed this protectionist-intent argument on multiple grounds, including that SWSA had waived the 
argument on appeal by failing to raise it in the district court. Id. at 807–08. 
 142. Id. at 809 (relying on the “unquestionably legitimate” language of Granholm). 
 143. Id. at 809–10.  
 144. Id. at 810. 
 145. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 475 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Wine 
Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 815 (5th Cir. 2010) (also upholding a residency 
requirement). 
 146. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., 731 F.3d at 812. 
 147. Id. at 811. 
 148. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489–90. 
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residency requirement was a valid exercise of the state’s Twenty-First 
Amendment power that did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
149
  
This Eighth Circuit case is the latest in a string of post-Granholm 
opinions that show that the allegedly “narrow” holding of Granholm has 
failed to create a useful structural framework for the lower courts to use in 
analyzing discriminatory state liquor laws. It is time for the Supreme 
Court to take up the issue again and clarify the extent to which its holding 
in Granholm applies to other types of alcoholic beverage regulations, 
including residency requirements for wholesalers and retailers. 
IV. THE CONFUSION CREATED BY GRANHOLM HAS INSULATED 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROBLEMATIC RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS THAT 
IMPEDE CONSUMER CHOICE AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
The Supreme Court has not yet examined the extent to which its 
holding in Granholm applies to state laws that impose residency 
requirements on the retail or wholesale tiers of the distribution system.
150
 
As discussed above, the lower courts have split in their analyses of these 
residency requirements.
151
 Section A of this Part will briefly summarize 
the confusion created by the Granholm decision. Section B will examine 
the justifications given for these residency requirements and three-tier 
systems in general. Section C will show how these residency requirements 
impede consumer choice and the free flow of interstate commerce. In 
order to clear up this confusion, the next time the Supreme Court takes up 
a challenge to a discriminatory alcoholic beverage law, the Court should 
reiterate that the Twenty-First Amendment does not change the dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis and should clarify that its holding in Granholm 
applies with equal force to all parts of the three-tier system. The Court 
would, therefore, set forth a broader structural framework for lower courts 
to utilize when analyzing challenges to these types of regulations.  
A.  The Confusion Created by Granholm 
The Supreme Court suggested in Granholm that as long as the three-
tier distribution system is applied evenhandedly, the dormant Commerce 
 
 
 149.  See supra notes 136–48 and accompanying text. 
 150. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine this issue in 2011 in an appeal from the 
Fifth Circuit’s Wine Country Gift Baskets decision but denied certiorari. Wine Country Gift 
Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1270 (2011). 
 151.  See supra notes 79–149 and accompanying text. 
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Clause does not automatically prohibit such a system.
152
 But the lower 
courts have not been able to agree about how the Twenty-First 
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause interact when laws 
discriminate against out-of-state alcoholic beverage wholesalers or 
retailers.
153
 Defendants in post-Granholm cases have argued, and some 
courts have agreed, that Granholm should be limited to its facts and 
heightened scrutiny only applied to laws that discriminate against 
alcoholic beverage products and producers.
154
 These defendants argue that 
laws imposing residency requirements on wholesalers and retailers are 
simply insulated from the dormant Commerce Clause as part of the 
“unquestionably legitimate” structure of the three-tier system.155 Post-
Granholm courts that have struck down residency requirements for 
wholesalers and retailers have read Granholm broadly as requiring 
heightened scrutiny for all discriminatory alcoholic beverage laws, not just 
those discriminating against products or producers.
156
 The courts that have 
upheld residency requirements have taken the narrower view advocated by 
defendants.
157
 
Although the Court in Granholm held that “any contention that § 2 of 
the Twenty-first Amendment immunizes discriminatory direct-shipment 
laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny” was foreclosed by its own 
precedent,
158
 the lower courts have not all followed this direction.
159
 Also, 
the Supreme Court advised in Granholm that it would not approve of state 
laws that “require an out-of-state firm to become a resident in order to 
compete on equal terms,”160 yet this appears to be exactly the type of 
provision that the Eighth Circuit upheld in Southern Wine.
161
 
 
 
 152. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–89 (2005); see also Teagarden, supra note 20, at 
350–51.  
 153. See, e.g., S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 
799, 804 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has sent conflicting signals about the relationship between 
these two constitutional provisions.”); Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 198–201 (2d Cir. 
2009) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (explaining that there is confusion and uncertainty about where the 
Supreme Court will head next in its interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment). 
 154. See Green, supra note 81, at 42–43. 
 155. See, e.g., S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., 731 F.3d at 809–10. 
 156. See, e.g., Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 
2008). 
 157. See, e.g., S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., 731 F.3d at 812. 
 158. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487–88 (2005). 
 159. See, e.g., Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 820 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The 
dormant Commerce Clause applies, but it applies differently than it does to products whose regulation 
is not authorized by a specific constitutional amendment.”). 
 160. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., 731 F.3d at 809–10 (giving the state “flexibility to define the 
requisite degree of ‘in-state’ residence” to “qualify as a wholesaler in the three-tier system”); see also 
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Furthermore, there is a question as to whether mandated three-tier 
systems are still constitutional after Granholm. If subject to heightened 
scrutiny—as Granholm’s overall reasoning would suggest—this system 
may not survive.
162
 At the very least, residency requirements that require 
wholesalers or retailers to become residents of a state in order to directly 
ship to consumers should be subject to Granholm’s heightened scrutiny 
analysis. Lower courts, however, have used the “unquestionably 
legitimate” language to justify less stringent analysis.163 Meanwhile, 
consumers must bear the negative effects of an alcoholic beverage 
distribution system that can no longer keep up with rapid technological 
advancements, the rise of craft beverage production, and the consolidation 
of the wholesaler tier. 
B.  The Justifications for the Three-Tier System and Residency 
Requirements 
The three-tier system has—or at least had—admirable goals. As 
mentioned in Part I, states initially utilized this system as a means of 
preventing tied-house arrangements that had led to aggressive marketing 
techniques and the proliferation of the saloon.
164
 Preventing tied-house 
arrangements can also encourage competition because independent 
distributors and retailers—in an ideal world—are just that: truly 
independent.
165
 In theory, distributors can buy whatever they want, from 
 
 
Wine Country Gift Baskets.com, 612 F.3d at 815, 819–20 (upholding a residency requirement for 
retailers despite Granholm’s admonition about requiring an out-of-state entity to become a resident in 
order to compete on equal terms). 
 162. For example, in Siesta Village Market, the court rejected Michigan’s argument that requiring 
out-of-state retailers to open a location in Michigan, become part of the state’s three-tier system, and 
obtain a license were parts of its three-tier system and therefore authorized by the Twenty-First 
Amendment. Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 2008); see 
also generally Murphy, supra note 57 (arguing that the three-tier system would likely not survive this 
heightened scrutiny). 
 163.  See, e.g., supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 164. See MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 30–33; see also Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n v. Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 487 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 1971) (“The principal method utilized by state 
legislatures to avoid these anti-social developments was the establishment of a triple-tiered distribution 
and licensing scheme.”). 
 165. This is not, however, an ideal world. Distributors are often under implicit, if not explicit 
(contractual), influence from big producers. See STEVE HINDY, THE CRAFT BEER REVOLUTION: HOW 
A BAND OF MICROBREWERS IS TRANSFORMING THE WORLD’S FAVORITE DRINK 164 (2014) 
(discussing “equity agreements” that large brewers used as an attempt “to ensure that their distributors 
concentrated their efforts on selling the large brewers’ products”); see also generally Leslie Pariseau, 
Have Big Liquor Brands Become Too Influential?, PUNCH (Mar. 12, 2014), http://punchdrink.com/ 
articles/have-big-liquor-brands-become-too-influential/, archived at http://perma.cc/J663-PQRF 
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whomever they want, and sell it to a variety of retailers, including bars, 
restaurants, and liquor stores.
166
 This purportedly increases consumer 
choice because retail establishments are able to offer a wide variety of 
alcoholic beverage options instead of being “tied” to just one brand or one 
producer’s products.167 
Although distributors would benefit from the ability to ship directly to 
consumers in any state that allowed in-state distributors to do so, they have 
much to lose if the three-tier system is dismantled. As long as the three-
tier system is intact, distributors are guaranteed a highly profitable
168
 role 
as middlemen through whom alcoholic beverages must pass to reach 
consumers.
169
 Alcoholic beverage distributors are powerful political 
entities
170
 and have lobbied to restrict direct shipping from the other 
tiers.
171
 They argue that the three-tier system creates important economies 
of scale
172
 and emphasize the importance of face-to-face transactions in 
 
 
(explaining that large “[l]iquor companies pay distributors who sell to the bars to focus their efforts on 
specific brands”). 
 166.  What Is a Beer Distributor?, NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, https://www.nbwa.org/ 
about/what-beer-distributor (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) (“Beer distributors source beer from a wide 
variety of importers and manufacturers.”); see also MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 118 (“Many states 
also prohibit . . . exclusive dealing, in which a retailer is obligated to sell the alcoholic beverages of a 
particular producer of wholesaler.”).  
 167. See Mike Reis, Beer Issues: What’s Up with the Three-Tier System?, SERIOUS EATS (Jan. 8, 
2014, 2:00 PM), http://drinks.seriouseats.com/2014/01/craft-beer-three-tier-system-pros-cons-
distributor-retailer-debate.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9N2S-R4JC. 
 168. “[W]holesaling is big business.” David White, Wholesale Robbery in Liquor Sales, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/opinion/04white.html (describing how the 
nation’s two largest wholesalers had combined revenues of about $13 billion). 
 169. See James Alexander Tanford, E-Commerce in Wine, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 275, 305 (2007) 
(describing how “a true national Internet wine market threatened the wine wholesalers’ privileged (and 
lucrative) position as wine’s exclusive distributor”).  
 170. The Center for Responsive Politics lists the National Beer Wholesalers Association as 
number thirty-eight on its list of “Top Organization Contributors,” with total political campaign 
contributions topping $33 million. Top Organization Contributors, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.php?order=A (last visited Apr. 5, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FJ7D-B9WK.  
 171. See Tanford, supra note 169, at 305; see also National Beer Wholesalers Assn, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000101&year= 
2015 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/F3WY-YXNQ (listing the National Beer 
Wholesalers Association’s total lobbying expenditures for 2015 as $1,420,000). 
 172. See DAVID S. SIBLEY & PADMANABHAN SRINAGESH, WINE & SPIRITS WHOLESALERS OF 
AM., DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF THE THREE-TIER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 43 (2008), available at 
http://www.five-star-wine-and-spirits.com/includes/archivos/about_five_start/pdf/three_tier_01.pdf 
(concluding that allowing producers to ship directly to retailers would “reduce the economies of scope, 
scale and density in the traditional distribution system, increasing the costs of all the participants . . . 
and ultimately reducing the benefits of low prices and superior variety at nearby locations to customers 
who rely on the three-tier system”). 
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the alcoholic beverage industry.
173
 The rationale is that face-to-face 
transactions help avoid sales to minors,
174
 but, as the Court in Granholm 
made clear, there are nondiscriminatory means for achieving this end.
175
 
The distributors have fought alongside the states in court to defend 
protectionist laws that keep their position in the marketplace intact.
176
 
They have also fought against the states, using Granholm to argue that 
residency requirements are unconstitutional as applied to them.
177
 
Wholesalers also can perform important functions such as collecting 
state taxes, ensuring the legality of alcoholic beverage transactions, and 
creating economies of scale.
178
 These functions and the noble goals of 
increasing competition and decreasing brazen marketing techniques at 
retail establishments may justify allowing beverage transactions to occur 
within a multi-tiered distribution system. They do not, however, justify 
mandating this system,
179
 especially in light of the adverse effects the 
system has on consumers.
180
 
Another rationale for protectionist alcoholic beverage laws is that 
alcohol is a unique article of commerce such that otherwise-impermissible 
burdens on interstate commerce are allowed.
181
 Reasons often cited (and 
the reasons rejected by the majority in Granholm) for allowing these 
burdens are the prevention of underage alcohol consumption and the 
 
 
 173. See Dana Nigro, U.S. Supreme Court Overturns Wine-Shipping Bans, WINE SPECTATOR 
(May 16, 2005), http://www.winespectator.com/webfeature/show/id/US-Supreme-Court-Overturns-
Wine-Shipping-Bans_2543, archived at http://perma.cc/8GNJ-K3FM (quoting Wine & Spirits 
Wholesalers of America’s President and CEO Juanita Duggan as claiming that, as a result of 
Granholm, “states have a choice between supporting face-to-face transactions by someone licensed to 
sell alcohol or opening up the floodgates”). 
 174. Id. (“Many of [the wholesalers’] anti-shipping campaigns have focused on the supposed ease 
with which teenagers could order wine online.”).  
 175. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489–92 (2005). Also, producers may not share this 
favorable view of the distributors’ role; instead, some see distributors “rak[ing] in huge profits with 
virtually no responsibility” or risk. Desireé C. Slaybaugh, A Twisted Vine: The Aftermath of Granholm 
v. Heald, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 265, 266 (2011). 
 176. E.g., S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 
799 (8th Cir. 2013) (with amicus briefs on behalf of the Missouri Division of Alcohol & Tobacco 
Control from the National Beer Wholesalers Association and the Missouri Beer Wholesalers 
Association); Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2010) (describing 
the intervention of two Texas alcoholic beverage wholesalers on behalf of defendant Alan Steen, the 
Administrator of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission). 
 177. See, e.g., S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., 731 F.3d 799 (example of a wholesaler challenging a 
state’s residency requirement for distributors). 
 178. See generally SIBLEY & SRINAGESH, supra note 172. 
 179. Indeed, states have no issue with soft drink producers, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi, selling 
directly to retailers. See David White, Prohibition, Online, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/17/opinion/la-oe-white-online-wine-20101217. 
 180.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 181. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 494 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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assurance of tax collection.
182
 These concerns about sales to minors and 
tax avoidance are even less persuasive when a state allows out-of-state 
producers to ship directly, but prohibits out-of-state wholesalers or 
retailers from doing so.
183
 As the district court in Siesta Village Market 
noted many times, if a state is to defend such an arrangement, it needs to 
discuss its “experience regulating out-of-state [producers] and why those 
same methods would not work for out-of-state retailers.”184 States, 
apparently unable to do so, instead revert back to “sweeping assertions” 
about why they would not be able to regulate out-of-state entities—the 
“same ‘sweeping assertions’” as those struck down by the Supreme Court 
in Granholm v. Heald.
185
 
Another reason proffered to legitimize residency requirements for 
retailers or wholesalers is that in-state entities are expected to be more 
“socially responsible.”186 The Eighth Circuit found this argument 
persuasive in the Southern Wine case to justify Missouri’s residency 
requirement.
187
 The argument is that entities are more likely to be socially 
responsible when they are present in the surrounding communities that 
bear the negative externalities of liquor consumption, such as alcoholism, 
underage drinking, and drunk driving.
188
 Alcohol traditionally,
189
 and even 
today, has had a serious “moral” nature that puts it within a state’s “police 
power.”190 This characterization of alcohol helps explain why the Supreme 
Court originally interpreted section two of the Twenty-First Amendment 
as giving states broad powers over the manufacture and sale of alcoholic 
 
 
 182. See id. at 490–91; see also Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 434 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
 183. See Dale Robertson, Ordering Wine Online? Not So Fast, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 8, 2009, 6:30 
AM), http://www.chron.com/life/food/article/Ordering-wine-online-Not-so-fast-1566430.php (quoting 
a major California retailer who described the process for an out-of-state direct shipment to Texas as 
follows: “[W]e’ll charge [the customer] the required state sales and excise taxes and send the money to 
Texas. It’s that simple—that’s what the wineries do—and we’d have no problem doing it.”). 
 184. Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 185. Id. at 1041, 1044 (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492). 
 186. See S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 811 
(8th Cir. 2013). 
 187. Id. at 810–11 (but using “deferential scrutiny” in examining this justification). 
 188. Id. 
 189. In colonial times, the role of social responsibility for controlling alcohol consumption fell to 
retailers, who were subject to strict controls and were often required to have a “good reputation” in the 
community in order to be granted a liquor license. MENDELSON, supra note 16, at 19. Producers and 
distributors were mostly unregulated. Id.  
 190. See id. at 21. The police power gives states the authority to “protect the safety, health, 
welfare, and morals of the community.” Id. at 21, 201 n.93. This power is conferred upon the states by 
the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 201 n.93. 
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beverages within their borders.
191
 However, as Judge Calabresi has 
explained, “[i]n the ensuing decades . . . as attitudes toward alcohol have 
changed and its commerce has become more nationalized, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly read the Twenty-First Amendment more narrowly, 
and excluded from its protection any number of state regulatory schemes 
that, to be sure, discriminated against interstate commerce.”192 Thus, these 
social and moral justifications for allowing states to discriminate against 
out-of-state wholesalers and retailers are less viable today and, more 
importantly, out of line with the Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence as 
set forth in Granholm. Still, some circuit courts have been persuaded by 
these social and moral concerns. 
C. The Adverse Effects of a Mandated Three-Tier Distribution System and 
Residency Requirements for Distributors and Retailers 
Mandated three-tier distribution and discriminatory residency 
requirements for alcoholic beverage distributors and retailers result in 
increased burdens on out-of-state wholesalers and retailers. These laws 
“mandate differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”193 These burdens 
include requiring out-of-state entities to set up a location in the state or 
become a resident of the state in order to directly reach consumers there. 
But these residency requirements also, and more importantly, result in 
many adverse effects for consumers and smaller producers. 
1. Adverse Effects for Consumers 
One adverse effect for consumers is that the three-tier system increases 
prices because alcoholic beverages are subject to additional markups and 
taxes at every level of the system.
194
 States may argue that higher prices 
actually serve a legitimate local purpose because higher prices reduce 
consumption
195
 and thus the problems related to overconsumption.
196
 But 
 
 
 191. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 485 (2005). 
 192. Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., concurring); 
see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 485–86 (explaining that this early interpretation is “inconsistent” with 
the Court’s current view, and that “more recent cases . . . confirm that the Twenty-first Amendment 
does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution”). 
 193. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 194. See Reis, supra note 167; White, supra note 168 (explaining that wholesaling increases the 
retail prices consumers pay by an estimated 18 to 25 percent). 
 195. See Elyse Grossman & James F. Mosher, Public Health, State Alcohol Pricing Policies, and 
the Dismantling of the 21st Amendment: A Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 177, 196–97 
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if states want to decrease the consumption of alcohol by increasing prices, 
this can be achieved by less discriminatory means, such as increased taxes 
for all liquor sold, regardless of where it is produced.
197
 Instead, by forcing 
products through a three-tier system, this looks less like promoting 
temperance through increased prices and more like providing guaranteed 
roles for in-state alcoholic beverage entities.
198
 
Discriminatory direct-shipping restrictions also increase consumer 
prices by largely cutting off online competition.
199
 For example, a recent 
empirical study by Jerry Ellig and Alan E. Wiseman examined the price 
effects of two types of post-Granholm discriminatory alcoholic beverage 
statutes and found that these types of laws have “noticeable effects on 
price competition in local markets.”200 Ellig and Wiseman looked at laws 
that permit out-of-state producers to ship directly to consumers, but 
prohibit out-of-state retailers from doing so,
201
 such as the laws in question 
in Arnold’s Wines,202 Wine Country Gift Baskets.com,203 and Siesta Village 
Market.
204
 They found that because alcoholic beverage producers “usually 
charge higher prices than online retailers, excluding out-of-state retailers 
limits the price savings that are available online.”205 As Ellig and Wiseman 
point out, “seemingly small details in law can map into substantial 
differences in outcomes when considering prices, consumer demand, and 
other aspects of alcohol consumption, production, and the like.”206 By 
 
 
(2011) (explaining how the link between increased alcoholic beverage prices and decreased 
consumption is well established). 
 196. See id. at 197 (explaining that “higher prices . . . reduce the number of young people who 
drink and drive, die from alcohol-related traffic or injury fatalities, contract sexually transmitted 
diseases and engage in alcohol-related violence”). Grossman and Mosher also describe cases in which 
states have defended alcoholic beverage regulations on the grounds that the laws increased prices and 
therefore decreased consumption. Id. at 196–98. 
 197. See id. at 191 & n.116 (citing Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, No. C04-360P, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27141, at *19 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2006)). 
 198. See Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1043 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(explaining that loss of tax revenue is “not a legitimate reason to uphold a discriminatory statute” and 
characterizing such a justification as “pure protectionism”). 
 199. Jerry Ellig & Alan E. Wiseman, Price Effects and the Commerce Clause: The Case of State 
Wine Shipping Laws, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 196, 197–98 (2013).  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. Ellig and Wiseman also looked at state statutes that impose size restrictions on direct-to-
consumer shippers, a type of discriminatory alcoholic beverage statute not considered by this Note. Id. 
 202. Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 203. Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 811–12 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 204. Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1037, 1040 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 205. Ellig & Wiseman, supra note 199, at 198. Specifically, online retailers offered price savings 
as compared to the lowest brick-and-mortar store price on 57 to 81 percent of wine bottles studied 
(shipping via ground). Id. at 211. 
 206. Id. at 204. 
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excluding out-of-state retailers from the alcoholic beverage market, states 
are reducing important competitive pressure that keeps prices in check. 
Although Ellig and Wiseman did not look at laws that impose residency 
requirements on distributors, such as the law in the Southern Wine case,
207
 
it is reasonable to presume that similar results would present themselves 
and that these laws also have adverse cost effects for consumers in the 
alcoholic beverage market by reducing competition from out-of-state 
distributors. 
Additionally, despite the increasing viability and ubiquity of e-
commerce,
208
 consumers in many states are unable to take advantage of 
these technological advancements because the states prohibit out-of-state 
retailers or wholesalers from shipping directly to consumers. Infrastructure 
is being put in place to support online alcoholic beverage marketplaces.
209
 
For example, Amazon, a Fortune 100 company that specializes in e-
commerce and online marketplaces,
210
 has created an online marketplace 
that enables wineries to offer wine directly to consumers.
211
 This service is 
only available in thirty states due to restrictions on direct shipping in other 
states.
212
 Consumers in the other states are unable to enjoy the same 
variety and access to boutique products provided by such services. 
These limits on direct shipment reduce consumer choice by prohibiting 
interstate shipment of products only available online.
213
 Consumer interest 
in craft alcoholic beverages has surged, and the three-tier system cannot 
keep up.
214
 Most wholesalers, and many retailers, do not have the ability or 
the will to stock thousands of low-volume craft products in brick-and-
mortar establishments all over the country.
215
 Therefore, an online, direct 
 
 
 207. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 802–03 
(8th Cir. 2013). 
 208. E-commerce accounted for 6.8 percent of total retail sales in the United States in the third 
quarter of 2015. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: 3rd Quarter 
2015 (Nov. 17, 2015), available at http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/15q3.pdf. 
 209. See Madeline Puckette, What’s the Three Tier System and Why Is It Corroding?, WINE 
FOLLY (Aug. 29, 2014), http://winefolly.com/update/three-tier-system/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
4V3K-3CZN. 
 210. Amazon.com, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/amazon-com-29/ (last visited Apr. 5, 
2016). 
 211. Wine, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/wine (last visited Apr. 5, 2016); see also 
Puckette, supra note 209. 
 212. Amazon Wine States, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display. 
html?nodeId=201020560 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 213. See FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 18. 
 214. See Tanford, supra note 169, at 303.  
 215. See id. (“When there are too many wineries and too few wholesalers, the system will fail 
because the wholesalers will service the large volume producers and the small wineries will be frozen 
out of access to the market . . . .”); see also HINDY, supra note 165, at 166–67 (quoting the Brewers 
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shipment from an out-of-state retailer or wholesaler may be the only way a 
consumer can obtain a specific brand or label. 
The three-tier system is not able to respond adequately to this rapidly 
expanding and evolving market wherein consumers are seeking out new, 
rare, and exotic alcoholic beverage products. Because the official system 
has failed consumers and states have been slow to allow direct shipping 
from out-of-state retailers and wholesalers, illegal Internet black markets 
have developed to meet the demand for out-of-state craft alcoholic 
beverage products.
216
 This back-channel, illicit dealing in alcohol is 
exactly the kind of problem post-Prohibition alcohol distribution laws 
were meant to curb.
217
 
2. Adverse Effects for Small Producers 
Small producers are also often negatively affected by the three-tier 
system and discriminatory shipping restrictions. These producers do not 
benefit from the economies of scale that large producers enjoy, and they 
lose a bigger percentage of their profit for every additional hoop their 
products must jump through to end up in consumers’ hands.218 Some small 
producers may not even be able to find a distributor willing to distribute 
their products because the distributor is unable to sell enough of these 
producers’ beverages to make it worth the distributor’s while to take on 
the additional overhead.
219
 A surge of new, small producers
220
 and 
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 216. See Chen, supra note 29, at 542–43 (describing how consumer rights are often ignored in 
these illegal exchanges, leading to price gouging and product integrity concerns); see also Dan Adams 
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GLOBE (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/12/26/wine-connoisseurs-viney 
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 217. See Chen, supra note 29, at 529. 
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association.org/statistics/number-of-breweries/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
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consolidation in the wholesaler tier
221
 have made it increasingly difficult 
for small producers to find a wholesaler to distribute their products 
through the traditional three-tier system.
222
 Therefore, selling products 
through an online marketplace, such as the Amazon Wine Marketplace, 
may be the only way these small producers can connect with out-of-state 
consumers. But many states prohibit such an arrangement by imposing 
residency requirements for retailers or wholesalers to directly ship to 
consumers. 
The market for craft alcoholic beverage producers has expanded 
exponentially in recent years. Craft breweries make up over 98 percent of 
the breweries in the United States,
223
 and their numbers and production 
levels have increased even as total beer production numbers have been on 
a slow decline.
224
 The discriminatory alcoholic beverage laws discussed in 
this Note are particularly problematic because they create a barrier to entry 
for these smaller entities that are looking to expand distribution into new 
states.
225
 This barrier not only reduces consumer choice by inhibiting 
wider distribution of out-of-state products, but also makes it more difficult 
for small producers to survive in a competitive marketplace.
226
  
Finally, just as large producers can have substantial influence and 
power over distributors,
227
 large distributors can exercise substantial power 
over both smaller producers and retail establishments.
228
 This power 
imbalance may actually obstruct the free market that the three-tier system 
is meant to encourage. It can also inhibit small producers who may have 
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little say in where their products actually end up,
229
 even though the 
producers may have a better idea of the markets in which their products 
will thrive.
230
 If these producers were able to utilize online marketplaces, 
they would have access to a nationwide market that would allow them to 
sell their products everywhere consumer demand appeared. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower courts have split in their understanding of how the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Granholm v. Heald applies to residency requirements 
for alcoholic beverage distributors and retailers. Meanwhile, many 
businesses are suffering from increased and unnecessary costs of doing 
interstate business, or are precluded from doing business in certain states 
altogether. The Supreme Court should take up this issue to help alleviate 
the inconsistency of the lower courts’ analyses of these laws in the wake 
of Granholm. The Supreme Court should explain that the heightened 
scrutiny analysis of Granholm applies to laws that discriminate against 
out-of-state retailers and wholesalers. The Court should reiterate that the 
Twenty-First Amendment does not change the dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis for state liquor laws, and that states need to justify residency 
requirements by showing how they advance legitimate local purposes not 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. This will 
provide the lower courts with a broader structural framework to utilize 
when analyzing future challenges to discriminatory alcoholic beverage 
regulations. More importantly, it will result in increased consumer choice 
and lower barriers of entry for small producers, and will advance the 
development of a national market for alcoholic beverages in line with the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause and the free market system. 
Paul Knettel
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